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Locke: Cost accounting: An institutional yardstick for measuring British

Robert R. Locke
UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII

COST ACCOUNTING
AN INSTITUTIONAL YARDSTICK FOR MEASURING
BRITISH ENTREPRENEURAL PERFORMANCE,
CIRCA 1914
Abstract: This article, like that published in the spring issue, again finds fault with
recent attempts by economic historians to rehabilitate the reputation of the late
Victorian and Edwardian entrepreneur. It argues that, since after 1880 cost accounting became a "necessary" technology for good entrepreneurial performance,
the revisionist economic historians' failure to consider institutional factors, like
cost accounting, has led them to overlook elements essential to an appraisal of
comparative entrepreneurial performance. The growing inferiority of British costing methods, as opposed to American and German, moreover, meant a relative
British entrepreneurial failure.

In the first part of this essay, published in the spring issue, recent
negative opinions about the quality of British entrepreneurial performance, circa 1914, were criticized from a cost accounting point
of view.1 In this article attention shifts to the institutional basis of
entrepreneurial activity. Although the revisionists historians under
discussion are ostensibly preoccupied with the entrepreneur they
really have ignored the effect of environment upon his operations.
They have done this, moreover, even when the results of their own
studies indicate that the subject should be investigated. Roderick
Floud, in his study of Greenwood and Batley, observed, for example,
that the character of the company's accounting system
makes it impossible to measure the capital inputs, and
therefore, the cost of such inputs, making it impossible
to approach directly either the extent of, or the cost of
factor substitution in the form of the use of capital rather
than labor.2
If Floud could not measure these inputs could Greenwood &
Batley? Floud never tries to answer such a question. This is unfortunate because, again as Floud noted, quoting a contemporary
source, the firm's financial record was "simply disastrous."3 There
is something incongruous about saying that a firm had, at the same
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time, a disastrous financial and a good productivity record. The
accounts should explain why and if they cannot then perhaps
they might themselves be part of the problem.4 If they did not
supply management with the right information, then management
might be responsible for its own financial difficulties, despite, assuming Floud's conclusions to be correct, the firm's good productivity record. In other words the firm might be an example of inept
instead of good management, the proof of which is derived from
the discovery, through the accounts, of its internal structural chaos.
Revisionists have not spent much time explaining their neglect
of institutional factors in entrepreneurial behavior. What they have
said, however, boils down to a two point justification. First, they
accept the dictum that the market is the primary force in economic
life. They contend that, with sufficient demand, a skilled supply of
capable entrepreneurs will be forthcoming in a modern economy.
Or, to quote Professor Habbakuk's well-known appeal to demand
theory, "Great generals are not made in times of peace; great
entrepreneurs are not made in non-expanding industries."5 This
dictum simply excludes the hypothesis of entrepreneurial failure
causing economic decline, thus eliminating the necessity of bothering with the matter. Second, as econometricians they have not
found much merit in the socio-psychological or religious-institutional explanations of economic activity, some of which, like the
Weber-Tawney thesis, have in the past, gained great currency
among historians. Accordingly they reject the idea that the British
entrepreneur, for whatever particular reason, lost his elan. For
them it has not been proved and is, with these sociological methods,
probably unprovable, that Britain had a smaller pool of aggressive
entrepreneurs in 1900 than in 1850.
Both points are hardly indisputable. No evidence exists that great
entrepreneurs cannot be made during periods of contracting or
static markets. On the contrary, favorable marketing conditions can
permit less capable entrepreneurs to survive quite well. When the
crunch comes, when entrepreneurs are forced to compete fiercely
in a shrinking market they have to show ingenuity. More than one
industrial empire has been made under these conditions. A demand
supremacy theory, moreover, automatically raises questions about
the relationship between supply and demand. Institutionalists probably would concede that individual talent existed in equal measure
in Britain at different times. The problem is that individual talent
has to be expressed effectively. If a firm, an industry, or an economy
is not organized to provide the entrepreneur with information appropriate to a high level of management excellence, and if it does not
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have the organizational wherewithal to act on this information, then
the brightest and most capable individual will be frustrated. To
argue that Britain had plenty of bright young people about misses
the point since defective business organization and administration
could have prevented proper utilization of individual skills. This
was true, above all, when, during the second industrial revolution,
industry's technological and managerial needs could no longer
be satisfied in traditional ways, e.g., through in shop training.
Demand theorists would probably concede that individual talent is
wasted in a badly organized business but they would contend that
the market creates the organizational milieu. Institutionalists would
counter that, in this case, supply creates its own demand. But there
is no need to counter dictum with dictum. The question can only
be answered, if at all, by historical investigation, for either view,
depending on the specific historical context, could be correct.
The problem, however, is that econometric methods hinder rather
than abet this practical inquiry. McCloskey stated this clearly in the
following exchange with Professor David S. Landes. The issue was
the poor productivity of British coal mines, which McCloskey, in a
paper, attributed to unfavorable geological formations, that is, to a
natural instead of a human cause.
McCloskey: The purpose of the paper is to estimate the
magnitude of the geological effect. The argument, then, is that once these have been
properly measured there is no residual productivity difference to be examined by
entrepreneurship.
Landes: He objected to precisely this residual procedure. If one started with the entrepreneurial
explanation, one could exclude geological
conditions just as well. . . .
McCloskey: . . .If one does start with the entrepreneurial
hypothesis, there are no guides as to how to
put the argument in quantitative form.6
Mathematical historians are quantifiers. As quantifiers they have
concentrated on productivity indices, profits, and costs. Since the
creation of managerial structures cannot be examined quantitatively
within the framework of neoclassical economic theory, the subject
has had to be dropped. To ignore a subject because it is insignificant is not the same thing as to claim it is insignificant
because it does not fit into an explanatory model, even if the model
is deemed "sufficient."
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This does not mean the revisionist distrust of sociological-institutional explanations of history is unfounded. Tough minded thinkers
have preferred to shy away from the cause and effect quagmire
characteristic of most psychological and sociological explanations
of economic activity. Economics has, in this respect, been a much
more compelling auxiliary. This is why the New Economic History
has made such headway. There is nothing, however, that is soft
minded about managerial accounting. It deals with the institutionalization of modern management practices and it provides the method
through which this institutionalization process can be studied. It
permits the historian to measure the importance of the institutional
factor in entrepreneurial performance in a manner that mathematical history, as practiced by the revisionists, does not. Indeed,
because these revisionists have restricted their work to quantifiable
costs, profit, and productivity factors, they have been able only to
look at (some) of the results of entrepreneurial activity, not at
entrepreneurial activity itself.
Cost accounting theory and practice, then, is quite germane to
the debate about British entrepreneurship because accounting became an element essential to successful management after 1880.
Superiority or inferiority in cost accounting meant superior or
inferior entrepreneurial performance. The question is, therefore, how
did British accounting fare? Unfortunately an answer to this question
is not immediately forthcoming because the subject has been
handled with confusion in most histories of British accounting.
Although accounting historians generally agree that the British
trailed behind the Americans after World War I, they also invariably
claim that the British led the world in cost accounting before 1900.
This lead has always been explained indirectly, usually by stressing
the facts that accounting acquired professional status early in
Britain and that British writers dominated in cost accounting theory.
Neither contention, however, really proves that British industry ever
led in cost accounting. Although accounting undoubtedly acquired
a solid professional standing much earlier in Britain than elsewhere,
cost accounting did not benefit therefrom. In fact the opposite was
probably true. An analysis of materials published in The Incorporated
Accountants' Journal in the year 1875 revealed for example that
nearly all the leading articles are on points raised in bankruptcy law and practice, and the other pages are devoted
to reports of law cases on bankruptcy. . . . Hardly a word
in the old papers about taxation, costing, statistical
records; relatively little about utility companies or even
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about ordinary joint-stock companies: practically nothing
about that very important subject of recent years, the Holding Company, and nothing at all about mechanical accounting.7
The British accounting profession engaged almost exclusively at
that time in financial not cost accounting. It was, in fact, a liberal
profession made up of independent wealthy businessmen who did
not work directly for industry but acted as consultants, working
out of their own offices, much as lawyers do. The chartered or incorporated accountants, moreover, were not even exposed to cost
accounting during their training, for as young "articled" clerks
they were apprenticed to accounting offices instead of formally
educated in colleges or universities. They could only learn what
happened in the offices and, since the accountants seldom dealt
with costing matters neither did the apprentices. The clerks who
kept cost records in British industry were not chartered or incorporated accountants. They were poor, badly educated men who
received what training they got on the job in a factory bookkeeping
office. They hardly ever came into professional contact with public
accountants who, in any case, despised them because of their lower
class origins. Indeed public accountants did not consider these
industrial cost accountants to be engaged in accounting. J. M. Fells
remarked in 1910,
It is now some 23 years or so ago that my friend Mr. Emile
Garcke and I, in the flush of our youth, wrote the first
pioneering book on this subject. Then it seemed to be
thought by some that we had written a book on economics,
and not one on accountancy. The Accountant, which performs a most useful service in always representing the
average mind of the profession, pointed out that the work
was rather concerned with the wages and time books,
stock books, and matters of a similar nature, which, as a
rule did not come within the scope of an accountant's
duties.8
Because of this isolation the public accounting profession probably
ignored cost accounting long after its practice should have attracted notice. This neglect, moreover, had serious repercussions
throughout British business because the professional accounting
societies decided what subjects would be covered in the accounting examinations that the "articled" clerks had to pass. Businessmen, engineers, or progressive minded politicians could ask for
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greater emphasis on cost accounting in the training of young accountants but unless the accountants agreed nothing could be
done. And the accountants were set in their ways.
The literature which affirms Britain's early lead in cost accounting treats the subject exclusively in terms of theoretical development. The assumption is made, therefore, that superiority in theory
meant superiority in practice. Nobody, however, has thoroughly
studied cost accounting practice in British business. Nonetheless
the available evidence, which consists of contemporary observations
made by accountants on both sides of the Atlantic, clearly indicates
that no correlation existed. On the contrary, J. M. Fells, Britian's
leading cost accountant around 1900, commented about the backwardness of English practice.
There is no branch of accountancy that calls for higher
qualifications or a more mature experience than cost accounting; yet it would be no exaggeration to state that so
far as the United Kingdom is concerned, proper systems
of costing are the exception rather than the rule, and where
they exist they are seldom supervised by professional accountants. We have at last almost outgrown the amateur
auditor—at all events, so far as important business undertakings are concerned—but the impression still prevails
that professional accountants would be unable to offer
any practical assistance in connection with cost accounts,
the most intricate branch of business accounting.9
Fells, a consultant who had a special interest in promoting cost
accounting, could be accused perhaps of beating his own tub.
But rather patriotic Englishmen who were not ready to admit any
inferiority to Americans said the same thing. Thus when American
accountants in 1907 claimed they excelled in accounting technology,
the editor of The Incorporated Accountants' Journal politely but
firmly denied the charge. Nonetheless, although strongly defending
British accounting practice, he reluctantly admitted: "As regards
costing, the Americans, with some degree of justification, claim to
have led the way—that is to say, they have succeeded in getting it
more generally adopted."10
British accountants equally stressed the harmful effects that
poor cost accounting had on British industry. One accountant, a
Mr. Rider, wrote shortly after the turn of the century that he had
been able to analyze various competitive bids submitted by English
firms (the figures were taken from a series of articles on "estimating" in The Engineer). The result, he concluded,
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is rather humiliating reading for commercial men, particularly when we remember how English manufacturers have
recently been thrust to one side again and again on this
particular class of work by foreign competition. They prove
one thing most conclusively, namely, that in most, if not
all, of the establishments submitting the tenders reviewed
in the articles, there can either have been no intelligent
consecutive system of Cost Accounts, or the estimating
staff, being (as is usually the case) highly technical, had
considered any information compiled by clerks as not
worth taking into account.11
Negative comment was not reserved for older industries which
could be suspected of using antiquated bookkeeping. Fells observed, for instance, that the electrical firm Edison and Swan Ltd.
had failed to integrate its financial and cost accounting.
There £56,000 had been carried forward in the balancesheet as representing the value of certain work supposed
to be in progress, which had in reality been finished for
a number of years. . . . I contend that had the ordinary
books of account not merely been supplemented by, but
absolutely considered in conjunction with the manufacturing books of the concern, such a mistake could not
possibly have happened.12
Similar quotations can be given, moreover, to illustrate how
American superiority in cost accounting permitted American industry to operate more efficiently than British. Fells, who had
studied American and British railroad accounting closely, commented that "the accountant," the "goods manager," the "general
manager and everybody else" in the British Northeastern Railway
Company
agreed on one thing, viz., that they could no more "spot"
where the increase had arisen in the passenger traffic
than they could "spot" the decrease in the goods traffic.
This is not at all a desirable state of things. It is very
different from the manner in which the American railway
companies' accounts are kept. Everybody knows that Mr.
Pierpont Morgan, when he first took the railway companies
of the United States in hand, gathered together and studied
very exhaustively all the statistics he could get at, and, as
a result he pointed out that by increase in rates or decrease in cost of one-tenth of a penny per ton per mile
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the companies would receive some £60,000 or £70,000 a
year more. And if one looks at the elaborate accounts of
these companies one can see what a great advantage
these administrators have over administrators in this
country.13
Some years later another English accountant
American steel companies:

remarked about

A study of the great American iron businesses of the past,
culminating in the formation of the well-known Steel Trust,
is interesting, as disclosing how close costing was, and is,
employed by the steel kings in watching the management
of their concerns, and the position of a departmental
manager, whose production and costs were falling below
standard, seems to have been no bed of roses. 'Make good
or go' is a hard precept to work to.14
Rawlinson went on to say that "many great works" in England had
their own cost accounting departments, with separate sets of
offices, that prepared periodic reports on the costs of production
by department. Their weekly and monthly reports enabled management to eliminate many cost inefficiencies in a firm's operations.15
But he concluded that Americans applied cost accounting technology more intensively within the firm and more extensively
throughout industry than did the British and they used the information provided in order to cut costs.16
Accountants drew this picture just before World War I, when accounting technology was almost exclusively preoccupied with actual
costs. British performance did not improve relative to the United
States after standard costs and budgeting assumed importance in
the new technology (beginning during World War I). Indeed it got
worse, for the British even lost their claim to theoretical superiority.
One leading accountant, Lord Stamp, described the theoretical
laggardness in 1925:
English accounting practice has been developing for
many years, but it has not made any substantive contribution to economic science over its own field of analysis of
the results of industry, although it has practically a monopoly grip of the required data. Accountants have the figures;
other people cannot use them and if accountants will not,
then we get nothing; economics continues its abstract
declarations and business blunders on by individual
instinct.17
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The most imaginative work in standard costing, budgeting, and uniform costing was done elsewhere. The point, however, need not be
pursued since it is not disputed.
Because British cost accounting technology remained relatively
backward, the historian cannot, by studying Britain alone, determine
what factors were responsible for the retardation. That would be
like searching for the causes of something that did not happen.
Work can be done, however, comparatively, by looking for and at
similar institutions in Britain, after they have been identified as
causal factors in a country where cost accounting theory and
practice has flourished. Both America and Germany qualify in this
respect. American cost accountants have studied their own experience the most; indeed they, with rare exceptions, seem to think that
cost accounting is an Anglo-American institution.18
Inasmuch as accounting historians usually confine their analysis
to the English speaking world and its literature, relatively little has
been said in America about the impressive theoretical and practical
work done in Germany on cost accounting.19 Although theoretical
contributions were made by many intelligent men, a look at the
work of a giant among them, Professor Eugen Schmalenbach,
suffices to illustrate the theoretical development. Schmalenbach, an
accountant by training, realized in the late 19th century that accounting was an applied science and he devoted a lifetime, as a
professor in Cologne, to perfecting this business technology. He
was among the first to recognize the digressive, progressive, and
proportional nature of costs, and that technological factors, e.g.,
plant size, equipment, speed of output, unit and lot size, as well
as production factors, e.g., variations in volume of output, determined costs. He even constructed a management decision model
which, based on marginal cost theory, set minimal production costs
(or optimal profit levels) in a firm.20 Schmalenbach emphasized the
uselessness of historical costs, thereby anticipating standard cost
accounting and forecasting.21 He, in the 1920s, worked up the
charts of accounts and flow charts which became the basis of
uniform accounting, not only in Germany but throughout continental Europe. This German professor, then, "took cost theory
beyond its descriptive stage."22 For him accounting was a tool
which, as he explained when developing the concept of a "dynamic
balance sheet," enabled management in private or public enterprises to achieve maximum efficiency.23
Many of Schmalenbach's ideas sparked intense debate among
professional accountants, accounting professors, and accounting
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students in Germany. His concept of progressive, regressive, and
proportional costs was subjected to detailed analysis and found
wanting; his decision model was rejected as impractical. The point
is not, however, that Schmalenbach was wrong but that the
academic and accounting community, under his influence, debated
the essential features of management accounting. This debate
began a decade before the First World War and continued through
the conflict unabated. Then in the 1920s there began
research on a portentous scale; dozens of scholars occupied only with scientific work, textbooks, and monographs; a half-dozen or more periodicals and a well-trained
staff of considerable size busied with the theoretical and
practical problems of the newly-created
'Betriebswirtschaftslehre.'24
German business economics became the most theoretically oriented
in the world, and cost accounting theory was an important part of
German business economics. Indeed before World War I it was
business economics in Germany. As a result German academic
accountants made significant contributions to the science of cost
accounting. Their work in value theory was unparalleled in its
analytical sophistication and their contributions to uniform cost
accounting theory were equally unrivaled.
From the beginning Germans never forgot that theory had little
meaning unless it affected industrial practice. Schmalenbach certainly conceived of accounting as an applied science. Between 1906
and 1914 his periodical, the Zeitschrift für
handelswissenschaftliche
Forschung, regularly published articles, written by working cost
accountants and engineers, that described current industrial accounting procedures. The war and the defeat, moreover, triggered
a fundamental reevaluation of German industry that culminated in
the "rationalization" movement of the postwar era. Most descriptions
of the movement concentrate on the 1920s, but, as far as cost
accounting is concerned, it really began with the cost accounting
renaissance in German industry shortly after 1900 and ended with
the Nazi efforts to implement a uniform system of modern cost
accounting in German industry in the late 1930s.25
German achievements in cost accounting technology, therefore,
cannot be denied. But what about the institutions which succored
this development? First there were business factors. German industry tended quite early to be integrated into large-scale organizations. The big German banks, with state encouragement, fostered
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this integration. These banks, which were ". . .a combination of
commercial bank, investment bank and investment trust. . .
functioned as middlemen between the investing public and industry because they took". . .the stocks and bonds [of a company]
and tried to place them with the public."26 Improved cost accounting developed out of this relationship. In effect, the banks, as
middlemen, assumed a great responsibility towards the investor.
They needed, therefore, to have reliable information about the
financial status and business performance (both actual and potential)
of the firms in which they took an interest. The banks, therefore,
recruited and trained their own staffs of auditors, men, who, because they were interested in the industrial as well as the financial
performance of their clients, had to be trained cost accountants.
Through their work banks became cost accounting catalysts.
Auditors pressed customers into adopting improved accounting
systems. Indeed, when a bank held a company's stock in its investment portfolio, its auditors insisted that the client firm implement management control oriented cost accounting.27 Thus institutionalized interaction between banks and industry fostered cost
accounting.
This interaction, moreover, was characteristic of German business
structure. Such bodies as the German Machine Manufacturers or
the Rheinisch-Westphalian Coal Selling Syndicate needed good
cost accounting technology in order to operate their cartels efficiently. All of the cartels had "their standing committees on accounting and costing problems and laid down uniform systems for
their members."28 The German trade associations for heavy and
light industry (Zentralverband Deutscher Industrieller, founded in
1875, and the Bund der Industriellen, founded in 1895) also
acted as originators as well as clearinghouses for ideas
in the field of industrial accounting. The original purpose
of this collaboration was mutual assistance and better
understanding between members of the same industry.
[But] it . . . gradually developed into a comprehensive
technical advice system, whereby each accountant working in a particular trade or industry [could] call upon the
combined experience of his fellow.29
There is no doubt that "[t]he more rigid and comprehensive organization of industries in Germany," as an English cost accounting
expert remarked, "in cartels, syndicates, combines and similar
organizations has been instrumental in evolving unified methods of
control."30
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State supported educational institutions also promoted cost accounting. Although noneconomic in the sense that they were state
created, these educational institutions had direct—e.g., professors
worked as industrial consultants—contacts with private business
as well as indirect ones through the quasi-economic professional
associations formed to promote the interests of their graduates. Two
sets of institutions, with associated professional societies, existed.
There were the Technische Hochschulen which had grown up during the nineteenth century.31 By 1900 they numbered an impressive
eleven within the German Empire. Although education in these
schools had been exclusively technical, the professors, some of
whom were industrialists themselves, had grown conscious during
the last two decades of the 19th century of the need for engineers
to acquire management skills. Perspicacious engineers realized
that the new American challenge arose less from a technical than
a managerial superiority.32 This led them to scientific management
and cost accounting. Indeed the Association of German Engineers
(Verein Deutscher Ingenieure, VDI), to which many of these professors belonged, devoted an entire meeting in 1912 to the scientific
management movement in America.33 Professors in the Technische
Hochschulen, representatives from the VDI and from industry, many
of whom were graduates from Technische Hochschulen, and civil
servants, reviewing technical education, specifically urged that
greater emphasis be placed on cost accounting and business administration in the Technische Hochschulen.34 The first cost accounting courses were introduced there before the war. During the
first decade of the 20th century, moreover, numerous cost accounting studies written by professors in and graduates from the
Technische Hochschulen, were published.35 Thereafter Betriebswirtschaftslehre (theory of business economics) became a standard
preoccupation of professors and students.
The Handelshochschulen
(Business Schools) belonged to the
second set of institutions, the creation of which was even more
important in the development of cost accounting than the first.
The first Handelshochschule started in Leipzig in 1898, a second
in Cologne (1901), a third in Frankfurt am Main (1901), a fourth in
Berlin (1906), a fifth in Mannheim (1908), a sixth in Munich (1910),
a seventh in Königsberg (1915), an an eighth in Nürnberg (1920).
Two of them, Cologne and Frankfurt, formed the nucleus of universities which grew up in these significant commercial centers.36 The
professors in these new schools, not those in the older universities
and Technische Hochschulen, made business economics into a
respected applied science. Men like Schmalenbach and Schmidt

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol6/iss2/1

12

Locke: Cost accounting: An institutional yardstick for measuring British

Locke: Cost Accounting: An Institutional

Yardstick

13

. .wrote all the literature of scientific value and directed all the
scientific groups of scholars."37 The graduates from these schools,
who entered commercial, banking, and industrial pursuits not only
carried the idea of the professors with them but kept abreast of
technical matters on their own. The Verband Deutscher
Diplomkaufleute (Association of German Business School Graduates), which
was organized to defend the group's professional interests, published a series of technical books and a periodical (Der praktische
Betriebswirt, The Practical Business Economist) which kept members posted on cost accounting and related business technologies.
Thus three streams—the Technische Hochschulen and the engineering fraternities, the Handelschochschulen
and their graduates,
and the banks, industrial cartels, and trade associations—carried
cost accounting into the German economy. These three streams,
moreover, flowed together through the medium of the state bureaucracy. The interaction among these institutions manifested itself
even before the First World War, when industrialists, city officials,
für
and business school professors formed the Gesellschaft
wirtschaftliche Ausbildung, e. V. zu Frankfurt am Main (Society for
Education in Efficiency, Frankfurt am Main) which propagated the
latest business administrative and accounting techniques in a series
of lecture courses especially intended for working engineers and
plant managers.38 Professors and lecturers from various Handelshochschulen and Technische Hochschulen were active in this program which, despite the Frankfurt designation in the organization's
title, operated nationally. The institutional interaction was even
greater after World War I. The Reichskuratorium für
Wirtschaftlichkeit, RKW (Reich Development Trust), with state money, drew industrial leaders, professors, and state officials together in its
various committees in order to promote efficiency.39 Indeed in the
1920s the RKW began, under Schmalenbach's guidance, to publish model charts for various German industries.40 In 1927, in its
annual report, the RKW noted that
systems of uniform bookkeeping had been completed and
their adoption recommended in the following branches of
industry: engineering; lignite production; breweries; textiles; tile manufacture, rubber industry; coal trade; wholesale paper trade; and freight shipping on the Rhine.41
Finally the Nazi dictatorship profited from the same institutions
when it carried through a general reform in uniform accounting
during the 1930s. It is true that Eugen Schmalenbach, who had
chaired the Reichsausschuss für Betriebswirtschaft
(Central Man-
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agement Committee) of the RKW refused to serve the Nazis, but his
influence, through his writings, his students, and his earlier work
in the Rf.B was great. In fact, without the theoretical work of the
professors, the full cooperation of thousands of trained accountant
graduates from the business schools, and three decades of cooperative work among business leaders, engineers, and accountants on
various committees, the Nazis could not have begun the formidable
task of implementing uniform accounting in Germany.
The complex institutional supports that sustained the growth of
cost accounting in Germany did not exist in Britain. Since big
British banks did not finance industrialization they never developed
a similar institutional relationship with British industry.42 London
accounting firms, like Price Waterhouse, which became internationally famous, did serve the needs of the financial and commercial
community but, since the milieu was cut off from British manufacturing industries, the bookkeeping technology involved financial
instead of industrial costing. British industry, moreover, never
organized on the German scale. It was not compelled to implement
the cost accounting control mechanisms that were unavoidable in
larger, more rigid organizations.
Nor did English educational institutions consciously promote cost
accounting as part of a new management technology. Although an
Institute of Works and Cost Accountants was founded (1919), it
functioned along familiar lines—apprenticeship combined with Institute administered examinations, for which apprentices prepared
after work through self-study. The close connections between
higher education and accounting that developed in Germany (and
America) never took hold. Only in 1947 did "eleven of the larger
universities, by agreement with the main accountancy bodies," begin
a degree program in accountancy.43 But, since an accounting degree
had a "vocational" bias, neither Oxford nor Cambridge accepted
the scheme.44 Moreover, the accounting societies only agreed because the program perpetuated the apprenticeship system (after 2¾
years in the university a period of apprenticeship was required in
order to receive a degree). This belated and halfhearted recognition
of university work illustrates the reluctance of professional accountants, embedded in their institutes, to recognize the importance
of academic research and training. A few of the professionals saw
the need, but, as a group, English accountants continued to mouth
the old cliches about the superiority of apprenticeship over formal
education. This attitude deprived British accounting of the research
as well as the educational benefits which came from the German
institutions. "This insistent practical urge
" one apologist ad-
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mitted, "provoked a critic to declare that accountants were insensitive to the need for sustained academic study and research. It is
probable that a certain want of contact with the universities had
something to do with this apparent neglect. . . ." 45
What the English education system failed to do specifically for
accountants and cost accountants it also failed to do generally for
English management. The tendency to bring Oxbridge men into
management resulted in general ignorance of cost accounting at
the top where old school ties counted for more than managerial
skills. Even graduates with degrees in economics or business administration (from the few British universities that eventually started
such programs) did not possess the requisite knowledge because
cost accounting was not part of the university curricula. Theoretical
marcoeconomics, the glory of Britain, was the mainstay of education
in economics and business. Nor were British engineers much better
prepared in cost accounting. The long tradition of apprenticeship
training, which marked British engineering, once again discouraged
innovation. Engineering schools developed late and when they came
engineering education was almost exclusively technical in nature.
The men who organized the institutions did not seem to realize that
modern industry needed industrial and management as well as
academically trained electrical, chemical, and mechanical engineers.
The engineering curricula in the colleges and higher technical
schools were obsolescent, in comparison with the American and
German, from the beginning.
Nor did British government administrative and financial policies
effectively improve cost accounting technology. British authorities,
awaking to the backwardness of governmental cost accounting during the First World War, introduced better cost accounting procedures into the defense ministries.46 Moreover, they encouraged
private industry to adopt better cost accounting. State action, however, never meant much. Company laws, which required annual
audits in limited liability firms, encouraged better financial accounting. But cost accounting was not significantly affected thereby. Nor
did the taxation laws indirectly improve costing, as they did in
Germany. Whereas German law required corporations to pay taxes
according to volume of sales and turnover, thereby demanding more
accurate and complete accounts, English law only taxed profits. The
British government's failure to promote effective uniform accounting methods was to prove especially significant. As the country retreated from competition to protectionism in the 20th century,
British industry did not arm itself with the control mechanisms with
which industrial efficiency could be assured after the spur of com-
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petition disappeared. The neglect had serious repercussions during
the Second World War, for the British government, because of the
diversity of accounting procedures within particular industries, had
difficulty awarding and paying contracts. Without uniform cost accounting nobody was in fact quite sure what the costs were.
This essay on cost accounting development has ranged temporally
over a broad span. The revisionist econometricians out to refurbish
the image of the Victorian and Edwardian entrepreneur might be
tempted to say, therefore, that the critique has missed its mark.
So what, for the sake of argument, if the Germans developed a better
system of cost accounting than the British between 1900 and 1940?
So what if the German entrepreneur outstripped the British during
the same period of time? They have been studying the performance
of the late Victorian and Edwardian entrepreneur. I believe, however, that the revisionists, by restricting their analysis to the pre1914 period have not understood the nature of the debate. McCloskey and Sandberg listed four specific charges which the
pessimists have leveled against British industrialists:
(1) They were bad salesmen, especially abroad. (2) They
overinvested in old staple export industries, such as cotton
and iron, and were slow to move into industries of the
future, such as chemicals, automobiles, and electrical engineering. (3) They underinvested in the laboratories and
technical personnel required for the development and exploitation of applied science. (4) Most important, they
failed to adopt in many industries the best available techniques of production, such as ring spinning in cotton
textiles, the Solvay process in chemical, mechanical cutting
in coal, and a host of new techniques in iron and steel.47
All four charges, except the first perhaps, highlight an economy
undergoing a basic transformation. All imply that it is not the
country's past achievements but its ability to adapt to future requirements that is the yardstick by which "economic" accomplishments
have to be measured. Moreover all, except the first, are really statements about the structure of an economy. Even the first can be so
considered if salesmanship is viewed in terms of training and management systems. These are, by McCloskey and Sandberg's own
admission, the charges that they, revisionists, have to refute.
The problem is that, with their methods, the revisionists have been
unable, especially when restricting the analytical time frame to the
Victorian-Edwardian era, to deal with, much less refute, the four
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propositions. In order to chart trends in costs, profits, and productivity the econometrician needs long runs of commercial and industrial statistics. He is forced, therefore, to study industries that
have not only been around for some time but which have been
considered important enough to warrant statistical compilation. The
period was one of the most technologically innovative in history.
The new industries, which were destined to replace the older staple
industries, and which, therefore, were the most technologically advanced, economically dynamic, financially profitable, and structurally creative during the second industrial revolution, were only on
the threshold of their greatness at the turn of the century. Obviously
the farther the econometricians push statistical runs from 1900 or
from 1914 into the past the more they have been forced to deal with
older industries. And the more they have been occupied with the
older industries the less they have been able to study the British
entrepreneur during a period of transformation. S. B. Saul, when
reviewing the work of the new economic historians at the Harvard
Conference in 1970, noticed this limitation. "The Conference papers
were restricted to discussions of the older industries," he remarked
"even Floud's machine tool firm was definitely not of the new generation. What of the newer industries?"48
The statistical method, however, limits the revisionists treatment
of the old industries too. Economic historians tend to believe that
the old industries (iron, textiles, shipbuilding) suffered from a first
start handicap by the end of the nineteenth century. That may be
true, but there is no inexorable law of economic development which
makes it so. If an early start means that an industry is later automatically saddled with obsolescent plant and equipment then the
German chemical and electrical industries would have, in the 20th
century, to have been, because of their earlier start, inferior to those
of the British. The question is not so much which industry started
first as which was capable of constant adaptation and innovation.
The question is about industrial potential, c. 1914, not industrial
accomplishments. To examine "potential" the institutional infrastructure of industry has to be taken into account; for, if it is inadequate
during a period of industrial transformation, that industry's ability
to modernize its managerial and productive structure will be adversely affected.49 British entrepreneurs operated quite well in the
financial and managerial milieu of the first industrial revolution.
They had serious difficulties, however, adapting to the technological
and organizational demands of the second. The revisionists, with
their backward looking statistical runs on costs, profits, and productivity, have really ignored this essential point. That is why cost
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accounting is so useful. It is both method and object of research;
method because it provides the historian with analytical tools which
deal with structure during a period of structural change; object
because it is an essential part of the subject under investigation. A
study of its development shows that the econometric revisionist
optimistic evaluation of the British entrepreneur, circa 1914, is misplaced.
FOOTNOTES
1

Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 17-28.
Floud, p. 329.
3
Floud, p. 318.
4
Floud maintains that "although the financial administration of the firm was severely criticized after 1890, no similar criticisms were made of the quality of
work." Floud, p. 318. Good workmanship does not, of course, mean good productivity, low costs, or acceptable profits.
5
Habakkuk, p. 212.
6
McCloskey, Essays, p. 309.
7
Jones, p. 182.
8
Fells, The Accountancy, p. 69. Also see, Emile Garcke and J. M. Fells, Factory.
9
Fells, The Accountancy, p. 70.
10
English, p. 193.
11
Rider, p. 178.
12
Showell, p. 63. Fells' remarks follow a speech made by A. E. Showell.
13
Showell, p. 63. Fells is quoting a man named Joseph Pease, who was head of
the Northeastern Railway Company.
14
Rawlinson, p. 265.
15
Rawlinson, p. 265.
16
Rawlinson, p. 265.
17
Murphy, p. 43.
18
Thus Gardner and Littleton stay almost exclusively in the Anglo-American
world. A. A. Garrett, in an article "Accounting Research, An International Function," only deals with the Commonwealth, the United States, and the United Kingdom. David Solomons in "The Historical Development of Costing," mentions Germany in a short footnote.
19
Hanns-Martin W. Schoenfeld, who has written one of the few studies in English
on German cost accounting states that ". . . relatively little work has been done to
make known and to utilize in the United States scholarly ideas which have been
generated in Europe—which in industrialization and business research is second
only to the United States. Since central European ideas have had some—and occasionally considerable—influence on the field of business administration in Japan,
in certain countries in Eastern Europe, in South America, and in the rest of the industrialized world, scholars in accounting and related fields should have an opportunity to become familiar with this approach." Schoenfeld, p. v.
20
Schoenfeld, p. 52.
21
Schoenfeld, p. 52.
22
Schoenfeld, p. 52.
23
The best way to get familiar with Schmalenbach is through his periodical,
Zeitschrift für handelswissenschaftliche Forschung. He started it in 1906 and wrote
2
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many of the articles, and, during the first fifteen years, all the book reviews himself. The ideas in his books appeared first in articles in this periodical and often
quite early. Also see the recent biography in English, Forrester, Schmalenbach
and After.
24
Schranz, p. 279.
25
Brady (The Rationalization) is still the authoritative work. For the extension
into the Nazi period see Singer and Abel.
26
Abel, p. 32.
27
Abel, p. 33.
28
Abel, p. 35.
29
Abel, p. 35.
30
Singer, p. 13.
31
See Manegold and Lexis. For a comparison between French and German
technical universities see Locke.
32
Two works by the influential Professor Alois Riedler of the technical Hochschule in Charlottenburg are important (Ein Rückblick and Emil Rathenau). Also
see his Zur Frage and Unsere Hochschulen. Other professors of note are Otto
Kammerer (see his Verhandlungen) and Georg Schlesinger (see Selbstkostenberechnung).
33
Fifty-fourth general meeting of the VDI held in Leipzig. American advocates
of the "Taylor-System" were in attendance. See, James M. Dodge, Industrielle
and Georg Schlesinger, Betriebsführung—two speeches given at the meeting. Taylor's work was also translated into German, often by these professors. See, Frederick Winslow Taylor, Die Grundsätze, which was translated by Professor Rudolf
Roesler of the technical Hochschule in Aachen.
34
Abhandlungen. Of articles in this report see especially, Dr. von Wiese, Die
wirtschafts- und staatswissenschaftlichen Studien.
35
Two important works, at the beginning of this flood of books, were J. Lilienthal,
Fabrikorganisation, and Albert Ballewski, Der Fabrikbetrieb.
36
See works by Redlich, Eckert, Devinat, Schmidt, Isaac, and Mantsuranis.
37
See works by Schranz, Matz and Schmaltz, The Business.
38
Founded in 1903.
39
Beginning as a private organization (1921), it did not get very far until reorganized and financed by the state (1926).
40
Abel, p. 36.
41
Two accountants, G. W. Murphy and E. S. Most, who translated one of
Schmalenbach's books, said of him: "It is no exaggeration to state that he transformed the German accountancy profession by operating a revolution in the attitude of businessmen to accountancy, as much as by inducing accountants themselves to extend their vision and their range of activities." (Schmalenbach,
Dynamic Accounting, p. 5)
42
British industrialization was financed by individuals, by local banks, and by
reinvestment of profits. Although London was a great financial center, it was involved more in commercial loans and portfolio investments (e.g., state bonds, railroad and mining securities). Whether or not British industry lacked capital because
of London's failure to invest in home industries is a controversial subject. Some
feel that sufficient money was available from other sources, but the fact that the
big British financial institutions generally ignored home industries is not questioned.
43
44

Byrd, p. 37.
Byrd, p. 37.
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45
Bray, Recent, p. 199. Also see Bray, The English. In 1911 a Mr. James Paterson of Glasgow told an Assembly of Incorporated Accountants: "I find, and I
think it is the experience of all who have carefully examined the cases that came
under their notice, that a student who has been in a good office, and who has the
natural ability to assimilate what he sees and reads, makes a better accountant
than the man who starts off with the halo of a University education (Applause).
I think that our method of examination, subject to certain qualifications, is a far
better test than even a degree in economics in the Berlin University. (Hear, hear)
We get far better results from a practical examination than from one in mere theory." Nelson, p. 20. This attitude persisted in the profession through World War II.
46
Grimwood, pp. 114-20.
47
McCloskey and Sandberg, p. 92. The list of charges is repeated in McCloskey,
p. 4.
48
Saul, p. 396.
49
An excellent description of management's preparation (in research, development, and marketing) against obsolescence can be found in Sydney H. Higgins,
Dyeing. Higgins wrote this study after a lengthy tour of factories in various countries. The chapter on color production is especially interesting because of the
future orientation of the German dyeing industry. Indeed as management became
more future oriented it became less susceptible to obsolescence. Members of the
Anglo-American management accounting team who visited the USA in 1950 were
amazed to find American manufacturers discontinuing product lines or replacing
plant and equipment that were perfectly "good" on the grounds that market and
production forecasting showed they had no future.
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